On the basis of a large panel data set of Italian private SMEs, this paper estimates a disequilibrium model of demand and supply of credit in the period [2007][2008][2009][2010][2011]. We 
Introduction
The financial crisis which erupted in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers has quickly turned into an economic crisis. The financial sector is closely linked to the real one, as banks are an important source of funding for firms. This is especially true in the Eurozone, where capital markets are relatively undeveloped compared to the USA and there are many small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Most of European financial systems are in fact intermediary-oriented rather than market-oriented. Since 2008 there has been an intense debate on whether European banks have reduced lending to firms. Because of its important implications, this debate has involved not only economists, but also politicians and the public opinion at large. The discussion is not about the fact that SMEs have received less credit from banks during the crisis than in the past, but on why it happened. In other words, have European banks reduced lending to firms or have enterprises cut their credit demand? This paper tries to answer these questions focusing on the Italian market in the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . From a theoretical point of view, the sudden dry up in bank liquidity could have affected the availability of credit by firms. A drop in liquidity for banks may have impacted the supply of credit for enterprises, especially for those unable to access other external sources of funds than banks, such as trade credit or financial markets. This is particularly relevant for private Italian SMEs, as their opacity makes it difficult to access funds from other sources. On the other hand, firms might also have reduced their demand for credit. Since 2008 Italian companies have experienced progressive reductions in sales, profitability and cash flows. In 2012 the balance between profitable and non-profitable firms remained below pre-crisis levels by more than 10 percentage points. The companies most affected by decline in profits were the smaller ones. The financial difficulties related to the reduction of income were associated with an abrupt lengthening of payment terms by customers. This led many enterprises in turn, to delay payments to suppliers. Shock, which was large and persistent, has come to represent one of the main channels of transmission of liquidity strains within the production system. The weak accumulation of capital could have decisively contributed to limiting the financing needs of companies. Existing literature has investigated whether reductions in credit lending during the recent crisis were caused by demand-side or supply-side factors. Some authors (Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; Puri et al., 2011; Jimenez et al., 2012; Iyer et al., 2013) suggest that reductions in business lending during the financial crisis were predominantly caused by supply effects, while other studies (Kremp and Sevestre, 2012; Rottmann and Wollmershauser, 2013) show that reductions in SME lending were mainly caused by demandside factors. Finally, Popov and Udell (2010) and Presbitero, Udell and Zazzaro (2012) find that both demand and supply factors led to lower SME lending in European countries in the financial crisis. These empirical results conflict and do not point to conclusive evidence of a capital-related contraction of credit supply in Europe during the recent crisis. The identification of changes in credit supply is particularly difficult because of the necessity to take into account credit demand changes (Udell, 2009; Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010) . Our paper tries to overcome this gap and empirically investigate the existence of credit rationing in the Italian corporate bank loan market by estimating the demand-supply disequilibrium model for bank credit. From this model we derive the proportion of credit rationed companies using a panel data set of private Italian SMEs for the period 2007-2011. This study contributes to previous literature in different points. First, our paper is the first to investigate the Italian credit market during the recent crisis by applying a disequilibrium model. Second, this study is one of the few using a large sample of private SMEs, and to take Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) show evidence of a contraction of credit supply in the Italian credit market in the period September 2008-March 2009. Quite strikingly, they find that larger less-capitalized banks reallocated their credit away from riskier firms (the so-called "flight to quality effect"), but smaller less-capitalized banks did not. A second approach to identify supply shock is to use survey data that contain information on loan applications Udell, 2010, 2012; Presbitero et al., 2012; Rottmann and Wollmershauser, 2013) . Popov and Udell (2010) find that both factors led to lower SME lending in 14 European countries in the early stage of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The authors verify that European banks experiencing stress to their assets and equity values extended less credit and that the observed decline in credit was greater among high-risk firms and firms with fewer tangible assets. These results were confirmed by a subsequent analysis on 16 emerging European countries (Popov and Udell, 2012) . Presbitero, Udell and Zazzaro (2012) come to the same results with reference to the Italian market. They find evidence that in Italy there was a significant contraction in both demand and supply of credit in the period 2008 -2009 . Rottmann and Wollmershauser (2013 find that in the period 2008-2009 only large German firms reported a very subdued willingness of the banks to grant credit. For this reason the authors argue that in Germany reductions in SME lending were caused by demand-side factors. A third alternative approach to identify supply shock is to apply a disequilibrium model to identify credit constrained firms (Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) . Kremp and Sevestre (2012) , focussing on the French credit market in the period 2000-2010, show that, even since 2008, most of the observed reduction in outstanding loans is explained by the decrease in French SMEs' demand for credit, following the big decrease of their business and investment projects. The studies described above show different results and do not yield conclusive evidence of a capital-related contraction of credit supply in Europe during the recent crisis. The identification of changes in credit supply is particularly difficult because of the necessity to take into account credit demand changes (Udell, 2009; Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010) . Our paper tries to overcome this gap and empirically investigate the existence of credit rationing in the Italian corporate bank loan market by estimating the demand-supply disequilibrium model for bank credit. From this model, we derive the proportion of credit rationed companies using a panel data set of private Italian SMEs for the period 2007-2011. In the study of the restrictions to credit supply, Italy is an excellent laboratory for three main reasons. First, although Italian banks have been affected by the financial crisis, their systemic stability has not been endangered (Panetta et. al., 2009; De Mitri et al., 2010) . Second, among European countries, the Italian market has the largest shares of private SMEs in its economic system. Third, and most importantly, Italy is a bank-oriented economy and, for this reason, changes in credit supply could make a big impact. Lastly, thanks to economic and banking features in common, the analysis of the Italian credit market during the crisis can help us to understand the changes in continental European markets at large. In order to investigate the demand and supply dynamics in the credit market during the crisis, this paper aims to verify the following hypothesis:
H1: Reduction in bank lending for Italian private SMEs during the recent crisis was caused by both demand-side and supply-side factors.
A number of studies have tried to identify which type of firms are more exposed to credit tightening (Bagella et al., 2001; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Presbitero et al., 2012) . Precrisis literature shows that SME financial constraints are inversely related to firm size (Bagella et al., 2001; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002) , and directly related to firm age (Bagella et al., 2001; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002 The first contribution to the literature is that this is the first paper to investigate the Italian credit market during the recent crisis by applying a disequilibrium model. Second, our paper is one of the few using a large sample of private SMEs. Specifically, we focus on 142,066 non-listed companies in Italy between 2007 and 2011. Third, to our knowledge, this is the first paper in literature studying the relationship between concentrated ownership and credit rationing.
Methodology
We empirically investigate the existence of credit rationing in the Italian corporate bank loan market by estimating a demand-supply disequilibrium model for bank credit (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000; Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) . In order to investigate the existence of credit rationing (i.e. a disequilibrium in the credit market), we estimate the following simultaneous equation model (Maddala and Nelson, 1974; Laffont and Garcia, 1977; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) 
where x1t and x2t are exogenous and independent variables, β1 and β2 are their coefficients and ε1t and ε2t are disturbance terms. In our model only the amount of bank credit received (Lt) is observed, while Lt d and Lt s are the results of estimations. Equation (3) links the observed amount of bank loans received by firms to the unobserved demand and supply. Specifically, our model assumes that the observed amount of bank credit is the minimum of supply and demand. This system of equations is estimated through the maximum likelihood method (Maddala and Nelson, 1974; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) . Further methodological details are provided in the Appendix.
The demand equation Lt d (1) depends on the following variables:
1) the size of the firm: we expect that smaller companies request more bank credit than larger firms, as they are unable to access other external sources of funds than banks, such as trade credit or financial markets. We accounted for the size of the firm through the natural logarithm of its total assets (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo Valverde et al., 2009) .
2) short-term financing needs: we assume that firms showing the highest increases in working capital in the year t compared to year t-1 will exhibit the greatest need for short-term credit. Following Kremp and Sevestre (2012) , we proxy short-term financing needs with the increase in working capital over total assets, although most previous papers use sales to account. We calculate working capital as the sum of trade credit and inventories, net of commercial debt.
3) long-term financing needs: as suggested by Kremp and Sevestre (2012) , we estimate the long-term financing needs using the amount of investment over total assets. We hypothesize that firms with greater long-term financing needs show a higher demand for bank credit.
4) internal available resources: according to the "pecking order theory" (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fama and French, 2002) , firms choose their financial resources following a precise order. Companies prefer internal available sources and, when these are not sufficient, they request external sources as bank credit. For this reason we assume that the demand for bank credit increases if a firm has less internal available sources. We measure internal resources by the company's cash flow over its total assets (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo Valverde et al., 2009; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) .
5) substitute for bank finance: we assume that firms with more substitute for bank finance show a lower demand for bank credit. Other sources of external available finance are taken into account through non-bank financial debt over total assets (Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) and commercial debt over total assets (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo Valverde et al., 2009; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) . Commercial debt allows for the role of trade credit as a cheaper and alternative source of short-term finance.
6) cost of bank debt: we expect that the demand for bank credit will decrease if the cost of bank credit is high. Following Kremp and Sevestre (2012), we measure the cost of borrowing by the ratio of interest expenses over total debt.
7) finally, we consider year dummies.
The supply equation Lt s (2) depends on the following variables:
1) the size of the firm: we expect that banks have reduced lending more to smaller firms than to larger ones, as smaller firms have higher failure rates than larger ones (Hall, 1992) . As for the demand function, we accounted for the size of the firm through the natural logarithm of its total assets (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo Valverde et al., 2009) .
2) firm's previous financial debt: we assume that banks were reluctant to allocate new credit to firms already heavily indebted. Firm indebtness is calculated as the ratio of financial debt to net cash flow (Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) .
3) firm profitability: measured by return on equity. We expect that banks have reduced lending more to less profitable companies.
4) the age of the firm: following previous paper (Bagella et al., 2001; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002) , financial constraints are assumed to be directly related to firm age, which is represented by a dummy taking value 0 for less than five year old companies, 1 otherwise (Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) .
5) firm default risk: ceteris paribus, banks prefer to offer credit to firms characterized by low default risk degree, for which the repayment of the loans is more certain. Following Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) , we proxy the firm default risk by Altman Z-score estimated for private companies (Altman, 1968 (Altman, , 1977 . This measure predicts the probability that a firm will go into bankruptcy within two years. The Z-score estimated for private companies is a linear combination of five business ratios, weighted by coefficients, according to the following formula:
where x1 = (current assets -current liabilities) / total assets; x2 = retained earnings / total assets; x3 = earnings before interest and taxes / total assets; x4 = book value of equity / total liabilities; x5 = sales/ total assets. 6) ability to provide collateral: we assume that banks prefer to allocate new credit to firms which can offer worth collateral, as they can have a signalling value (Bester, 1987) and reduce the information asymmetry between SMEs and financial companies (Chan and Kanatas, 1985) . In case of firm default, banks can sell the collateral obtained thus recovering their loans totally or partially. The ability to provide collateral is calculated by tangible assets over total assets (Carbo Valverde et al., 2009; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012) .
7) change in sales: we expect firms with bigger decrease in sales to be more financially constrained. The variable is measured by the change of natural logarithm of sales between t and t-1.
8) ownership concentration: we assume that banks prefer to allocate new credit to firms with lower concentrated ownership. Concentrated ownership in fact has negative consequences for firms, including higher cost of capital due to fewer diversification opportunities for investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983 ) and the possibility that large shareholders deprive small owners of their part of residual income. We measure ownership concentration by BVD Independence Ratio. This ratio, available in AIDA database, classifies firms into four groups: (i) no shareholder holding more than 25% of equity capital (independent companies); (ii) one or more shareholder holding more than 25% of equity capital, but not over 50%; (iii) more than one shareholder holding together more than 50% of equity capital (indirectly majority owned companies); (iv) at least one shareholder holding more than 50% of equity capital (directly majority owned companies). We proxy ownership concentration by a scale from 1 (independent companies) to 4 (directly majority owned companies).
8) finally, we consider year dummies. Table 1 shows variables used in the paper. Measured by the change in natural logarithm of total amount of bank loans between t and t-1 Table 1 defines the variables used in the paper. The data source is Aida database.
The model we consider is the following:
where Lt d and Lt s are the change in total amount of bank loans.
Sample
Following Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) and Atanasova and Wilson (2004) , we use a panel data set to estimate the disequilibrium model of Italian SME corporate bank lending. Our sample consists of 142,066 Italian SMEs for the period 2007-2011. Firm balance sheet data were extracted from the AIDA database. This database gives comprehensive information on Italian companies; it contains detailed accounts in compliance with the Fourth Directive (CEE) and information on: company financials, financial strength indicators, number of employees, local units, stock data (for listed companies), shareholders, ownership and management. The following selection criteria were imposed for inclusion in the sample: (i) being private Italian SMEs 1 , (ii) having available data for at least one year in the period 2007-2011; (iii) not belonging to financial and public service sectors. Table 2 reports the distribution of observations over different years for our samples. Table 2 shows that the number of observations is well distributed among the period, with between 20,000 and 27,000 observations for each year. Looking at the distribution of observations across the industries (Table 3 ) "Wholesale" and "Construction" industry contribute most with over 30% of the total observations. The sample is in general representative of the Italian economy as a whole. The data refer only to Italy but give an insight into the whole Eurozone. Italian credit growth as well as many other quantitative aspects of the Italian loan market are, in fact, very similar to corresponding aspects in the whole area. For examples, the correlation between Italian and European series of credit growth, bank interest rates, and the various European Central Bank ( ECB) survey indices, is very high. Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics for the variables used. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the sample (142,064 observations).
Finally, Table 5 shows the correlations between the independent variables. The results appear to support the theory that every independent variable has its own informative value in explaining the dependent variable. Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables (142,064 observations).
Results

Estimation results
Results of the disequilibrium model for corporate bank lending are reported in Table 6 , which takes into account the period 2007-2011. (3), (5) and (6), where the dependent variable is the change in natural logarithm of total amount of bank loans between t and t-1. The estimation was performed by means of the LLM (log-likelihood method) statistical package E-views 7.
As regards the demand equation, all economic independent variables are significant at 1% level, except for long term financing needs. More specifically, the dependent variable is inversely related with firm size: this means that smaller firms requested more bank credit than the larger ones, as shown by Atanasova and Wilson (2004) , Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez Fernandez and Udell (2009) and Iyer, Lopes, Peydro and Schoar (2013) . This suggests that SMEs are probably the most prone to credit rationing, which is consistent with previous literature (Fazzari et al., 1988; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) . Second, companies registering the higher increase in working capital in the year t compared to year t-1 exhibit the most demand for short-term credit. This confirms the evidence found by Kremp and Sevestre (2012) . Third, the demand for loans increases if a firm has fewer internal available sources. This evidence supports the "pecking order theory" (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fama and French, 2002) , according to which companies prefer internal available resources to bank credit, as suggested by Atanasova and Wilson (2004), Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez Fernandez and Udell (2009) and Kremp and Sevestre (2012) . As predicted, SMEs with more available substitutes for bank finance (i.e. non-bank financial debts and commercial debts) show a lower demand for loans. Moreover, the coefficient of the cost of bank debt is significantly negative. This means that a higher interest rate applied by financial companies reduces the desire for bank credit, as shown by Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez Fernandez and Udell (2009) and Kremp and Sevestre (2012) . Examining the time dummies, the results show that the demand for bank credit was lower in 2009 and 2010, other year dummies (2007, 2008 and 2011) being not significant. They do not therefore appear in Table 6 . As regards the supply equation, the results are consistent with our expectations, as all explanatory variables, with one exception, are found significant at 1% or 5% level. The only insignificant explanatory variable in our model is the index of firm profitability (Roet-1). A possible explanation is that the firm risk (Z_scoret-1) and the increase in sales (∆Sales) are sufficient for banks to have information about firm profitability. Firm size shows a significant positive effect on the amount of bank credit supplied to the company. This means that in the credit rationing process, banks reduced lending more to smaller companies than to larger firms, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. These results are consistent with the evidence found by Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez Fernandez and Udell (2009). As predicted, credit supply is inversely related to previous firm financial debt, because banks are reluctant to allocate new credit to firms which are already strongly indebted, as suggested by Kremp and Sevestre (2012) . Contrary to our hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), the negative coefficient for the age of the firm indicates that younger companies are offered more bank credit. This evidence, differing from Kremp and Sevestre (2012) , can be explained by considering that firms younger than 5 years represent only 5% of the total sample. The Altman Z-score shows a positive relationship with credit supply. This means that, as predicted, banks prefer to offer credit to firms characterized by low default risk degree, for which the repayment of the loans is more certain. This confirm that the "flight to quality effect", which Albertazzi and Domenico (2010) The ability to provide collateral, which in the literature shows an ambiguous link with credit supply, is found to exert a positive effect on a company ability to borrow loans from banks. In other words, banks prefer to allocate new credit to firms which can offer collateral, because in the case of default, financial companies can sell the collateral and recover the loans totally or partially. As predicted, the amount of tangible assets available to offer as collateral seems indeed to be considered a risk mitigant by banks, as shown by Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez Fernandez and Udell (2009) and Kremp and Sevestre (2012) . The coefficient of the change in sales is significantly positive, thus suggesting that firms with the bigger decreases in sales are more financially constrained. In the case of low firm profitability, ownership structure shows a negative relationship with the dependent variable. This means that banks consider a strong ownership concentration a negative element in deciding for lending. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 4. Private firms where the ownership is concentrated show indeed a high cost of capital and are often characterized by the presence of a large shareholder trying to deprive small owners of their part of residual income. On the contrary, in widespread ownership firms, shareholders exert control over one another and, moreover, all of them can offer personal collateral to banks. Examining the time dummies, the results show that the supply for bank credit was somewhat lower in 2008 and higher in 2010, other year dummies (2007, 2009 and 2011) being not significant. They are therefore not shown in Table 6 .
By means of our disequilibrium model we calculate the amount of bank credit requested by Italian SMEs and supplied by banks. We estimate credit rationing as the difference between the demand for bank credit of the firm i in the year t and the supply of loans offered in the same period, where demand exceeds supply. Table 7 shows the percentage of firms credit rationed in the period 2007-2011. Table 7 reports credit rationing estimations for the period 2007-2011. The Table shows the percentage of all credit rationed SMEs (column 1), the percentage of SMEs credit rationed over 5% (column 2) and the percentage of SMEs credit rationed over 10% (column 3).
As predicted, the results suggest that Italian SMEs have been credit rationed during the crisis, Since our individual demand and supply of credit are only estimated values, a small positive difference between demand and supply might be simply consequence of the approximations and not the effect of a true rationing phenomenon. For this reason we calculated not only the percentage of firms which demand for credit was higher than supply, but also the number of cases where the desired growth of the loans is 5% and 10% higher than that offered by banks.
Although the percentages are smaller, the overall picture is the same: SME rationing was particularly high in 2008 and 2011. It is also apparent that rationing is higher in years of financial or real sector crisis. Another important result of our estimations is that individual rationing is a persistent phenomenon: firms rationed in t also tend to be rationed in t+1 and vice versa. After defining the variable "rationed" as a dummy variable assuming 1 if the credit demand of a firm is higher than its correspondent supply, and 0 otherwise, we apply a probit estimation (Table 8 ). This estimation shows that the lagged dependent variable ("rationed" in t-1) is found positive and strongly significant. 
Robustness checks
The results proved extremely robust along several dimensions. A first robustness exercise is related to the empirical methodology. Since the disequilibrium model determines both the demand for credit and the corresponding bank supply to individual firms determined on the basis of their balance sheets, it is important to compare our results with those obtained by other methodologies. In particular, a useful comparison can be made between our results and those obtained by surveys, i.e. the Italian section in the ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS) as well the survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the euro area (SAFE). These surveys contain, among other data, information about the aggregate demand for credit and SME rationing broken down by country.
Information about aggregate credit demand from the quarterly BLS, corresponds to Question 4 of the survey ("Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises changed at your bank, apart from normal seasonal fluctuations?"). The answers, collected by the Bank of Italy, are used to construct both percentages and "diffusion" indices, whose historical behaviour is however very similar. Data on SME credit rationing can be found in SAFE. This survey has been conducted twice a year since 1999 on a sample of randomly selected companies stratified by firm size class (based on the number of employees), economic activity and country. SAFE contains firmlevel information related to company structural characteristics (size, ownership, age, sector, turnover) and firms' assessment regarding their financing needs and access to finance. We measure the existence of financing obstacles through the answers to the following question ( (1) applied and received everything; (2) applied and got part of it; (3) applied but costs too high; (4) applied but rejected; (5) did not apply because of fear of being rejected; (6) did not apply because of sufficient internal funds; (7) did not apply for other reasons. Firms that choose answers (2), (3) and (4) from the options are presumed to face obstacles to financing. Although we used an econometric analysis which is very different from BLS and SAFE, our results should be qualitatively consistent given that the phenomena under analysis are the same. They results cannot be mutually inconsistent.
Figures 2 a) and b) report the comparison between our estimations and the survey data. Survey data relative to demand have been aggregated in order to get the same annual frequency as the balance sheets we used, and we use the mean values of our single firm data.
The demand for loans shown in Figure 2 a) corresponds to the mean value of the various credit demands, while credit rationing is measured as the percentage of firms for which demand is higher than supply. The behaviours of the variables from the two different sources do not appear to conflict. Our estimations therefore seems to be credible, from this point of view at least. The econometric result therefore appears to supply useful information about the balance sheet items which determine the demand from, as well the supply of credit to, Italian SMEs. A further robustness exercise is related to the choice of variables. More specifically, variations of Equations (5) and (6) were estimated in order to assess the robustness of the results. First, in Equation (5), the following two variables were tested to account for financing needs: (i) sales to account (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009 ) over total assets in place of the increase in working capital over total assets, and (ii) the amount of investment over value added (De Mitri et al., 2010) in place of the amount of investment over total assets. We also replaced in Equation (5) non-bank financial debt over total assets and commercial debt over total assets with non-bank financial debt over total financial debts and commercial debt over total sales, respectively. Our results confirm previous findings. More specifically, credit demand is positively related to short-term financial needs and negatively related to firm size, internal available resources, substitute for bank finance and cost of bank debt. Second, in Equation (6), the following two variables were tested to account for firm indebtness and company profitability: (i) financial debt to total assets in place of financial debt to net cash flow, and (ii) the return on assets in place of the return on equity. Once again, this result seems to substantially confirm previous findings. More specifically, credit supply is positively related to firm size, company default risk degree, ability to provide collateral and change in sales, and negatively related to level of indebtness, firm age and ownership concentration. We also substitute in Equation (5) and (6) the dependent variable (change in natural logarithm of total amount of bank loans between t and t-1) with the ratio between the increase in credit loans and total assets in t-1 (De Mitri et al., 2010) . Our results confirm previous evidence, as shown in Table 9 . Table 9 reports the disequilibrium model for the period 2007-2011 applied to Equations (3), (5) and (6), where the dependent variable is the ratio between the increase in credit loans and total assets in t-1. The estimation was performed by means of the LLM (log-likelihood method) statistical package E-views 7.
Finally, we estimate the disequilibrium model by adding industry dummies to both demand and supply functions. Once again, our results seem to substantially confirm previous findings.
Conclusions
On On the demand side, firms which requested more bank credit are smaller companies, showing the higher increase in working capital, fewer internal available sources and fewer substitutes for bank finance. On the other hand, higher interest rates applied by financial companies lowered the requirement for bank credit. On the supply side, banks reduced lending more to smaller and highly indebted firms which presented a high degree of default risk. Banks preferred to allocate new credit to Italian SMEs which could offer collateral and showed bigger increases in sales. Surprisingly, older firms have been more financially constrained than the younger ones. Our results also show that banks consider a strong ownership concentration a negative element in deciding for lending. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to take into account the relationship between concentrated ownership and credit rationing. The work could be further refined by investigating the reactions of firms to credit rationing and disaggregating short-term and long-term credit rationing. 
where the logical symbol [xRy] correspond to 1 if xRy is true, 0 otherwise. Equation (a5) can so be explicited as: The components of εD independent from εS (corresponding to the residuals of the regression of εD on εS) are given by:
εD' = εD-(ρσD/σS)εS.
Similarly, εS' = εS-(ρσS/σD)
are the components of εS independent from εD. The standard deviations of εD' and εS' are σD' = σD(1-ρ2)1/2 (a17) and σS' = σS(1-ρ2)1/2 (a18)
respectively. The basic idea is that the probability for the actual Lt to be a supply is higher the lower εD': if Lt is much lower than its corresponding estimated demand, the possibility of a rationing is high. In terms of probability, Prob(Lt is a supply) = [1 -Φ(εD'/σD' )].
On the other hand, the lower are the actual loans compared to their estimated supply and the more likely that the demand is low and there is no rationing (that is, Lt is a demand):
Prob(Lt is a demand) = [1 -Φ(εS'/σS' )].
The contribution to the likelihood of an observation t is therefore:
[ϕ(εD'/σD')/σD'] [1 -Φ(εS'/σS' )] + [ϕ(εS'/σS')/σS'] [1 -Φ(εD'/σD' )].
